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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 25, 2019, the Texas A&M Journal of Property Law
and the Center for Law and Intellectual Property at Texas A&M
University School of Law jointly organized the “Pharmaceutical
Innovation, Patent Protection, and Regulatory Exclusivities”
Symposium. 1 Although none of the organizers and participants could
predict what was to come in the next few months, 2 there was a wide
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I1.1
Copyright © 2021 Peter K. Yu. Regents Professor of Law and
Communication and Director, Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M
University. Part III of this Article was presented at the “Pharmaceutical Innovation,
Patent Protection, and Regulatory Exclusivities” Symposium at Texas A&M
University School of Law. The Article draws on research the Author conducted for
earlier articles in the Florida State University Law Review and the University of the
Pacific Law Review. The Author is grateful to Saurabh Vishnubhakat and the past
and present members of the Texas A&M Journal of Property Law, in particular
Jessica Bonds, Cameron Saenz, Katlyn Humbarger, Karina Rios, Christian
Martinez, and Karen Alday for assistance in making this Symposium possible.
1. In addition to the four contributors to this special issue, the Symposium
participants included Professors Gabriel Eckstein, Erika Lietzan, Glynn Lunney,
Emily Morris, Arti Rai, John Thomas, and Saurabh Vishnubhakat.
2. It is worth noting that the public health community has made repeated calls
for better pandemic preparedness since the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS). See, e.g., THOMAS ABRAHAM, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
PLAGUE: THE STORY OF SARS 140 (2007) (describing SARS as “a dress rehearsal
*
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consensus that the rapid changes in the pharmaceutical landscape and
our continuous struggle to strike a proper balance between proprietary
protection and public access in the public health arena deserves
scholarly, policy, and regulatory attention.
To help contextualize the articles included in this special issue
and to inform readers about the inspirations and motivations behind
the Symposium, Part II of this Introductory Article explores the
different modalities of protection—in particular the role of patents and
regulatory exclusivities in providing the needed incentives to
pharmaceutical developers. Part III identifies three sets of challenges
that affect the future of pharmaceutical innovation at both the domestic
and international levels. Part IV utilizes a very recent event—the
COVID-19 pandemic—to illustrate the wide array of policy options
and possibilities both within and outside the intellectual property
system. This Part makes salient the nexus between the domestic and
international debates on pharmaceutical innovation.
II. MODALITIES
To provide pharmaceutical developers with the needed
incentives, the intellectual property system grants two predominant
forms of protection: patents and regulatory exclusivities. Patents
provide pharmaceutical developers with limited protection to enable
them to recoup the time, effort, and resources expended in research
and development. Although critics of the patent system have
for the more serious threat posed by a new influenza pandemic”); STEFAN ELBE,
PANDEMICS, PILLS, AND POLITICS: GOVERNING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 34
(2018) (“The episodic recurrence of … influenza pandemics leads many experts to
believe that new flu pandemics occur roughly once every couple of decades.”);
SONIA SHAH, PANDEMIC: TRACKING CONTAGIONS, FROM CHOLERA TO EBOLA AND
BEYOND 8 (2016) (noting a survey by epidemiologist Larry Brilliant that “90 percent
of epidemiologists said that a pandemic that will sicken 1 billion, kill up to 165
million, and trigger a global recession that could cost up to $3 trillion would occur
sometime in the next two generations”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., AN R&D
BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS: PLAN OF ACTION 22 (2016),
https://www.who.int/blueprint/about/r_d_blueprint_plan_of_action.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KR24-UNQL] (including “[h]ighly pathogenic emerging
coronaviruses relevant to humans” on the list of diseases that are “to be urgently
addressed”). Every year, my university colleagues at the Scowcroft Institute of
International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service hold a
pandemic policy summit and publish a white paper on pandemic preparedness and
response. See Papers, PANDEMIC & BIOSECURITY POL’Y PROGRAM,
https://bush.tamu.edu/scowcroft/programs/papers/ [https://perma.cc/5B8Z-RSG2]
(collecting the white papers).
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questioned this utilitarian justification,3 economists and other
commentators have widely recognized the need to offer strong patent
protection in the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors due to the
significant risks and high research-and-development costs involved. 4
It is therefore no surprise that the patent system has provided
pharmaceutical products with longstanding protection, which can be
traced back decades to the time when the synthetic dyestuff industry
sought to protect its inventions.5
Unlike patents, regulatory exclusivities—in the form of either
market or data exclusivities 6—are of more recent origin. While such
exclusivities vary from country to country, and at times go beyond
intellectual property protection into the area of drug regulation, the
international regime for market or data exclusivities did not begin to
emerge until the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights7 (“TRIPS Agreement”). 8
3. See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY (2008) (arguing that copyrights and patents are non-essential to
creativity and innovation and detrimental to the common good).
4. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 106–09 (2008) (noting the
important role of patents in supporting innovation in the pharmaceutical and
chemical industries); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 50 (2009) (“[S]tudies found that patents play a
major role in supporting innovation in only a few industries, most notably chemistry
and pharmaceuticals.”).
5. See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE
SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 59–60 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing
the efforts to protect inventions relating to synthetic dyestuffs and how such efforts
have paved the way for later protections for pharmaceuticals).
6. See Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 91, 103 (2016) (“Some use ‘data exclusivity’ to refer to statutory prohibitions
on submission of abbreviated applications and ‘market exclusivity’ to refer to
statutory prohibitions on approval of abbreviated applications and by extension
market entry.”); Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities and the Limits to TRIPS
Harmonization, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 674–75 (2019) [hereinafter Yu, Limits
to TRIPS Harmonization] (noting the distinction between “data exclusivities” and
“market exclusivities”); Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities in the Age of Big Data,
Biologics, and Plurilaterals, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. ARGUENDO 22, 27 (2018)
[hereinafter Yu, Data Exclusivities] (“While [market exclusivity] prevents the
marketing of a new drug based on the utilization of or reliance on previously
submitted clinical trial data, [data exclusivity] prevents the utilization or reliance of
those data during the exclusivity term.”).
7. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
8. See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 351 (2d ed. 2020)
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Article 39.3 provides pharmaceutical developers with protections for
the undisclosed test or other data they submit to regulatory authorities
for the marketing approval of their products. 9 In the first decade of the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), Article 70.9 further granted
exclusive marketing rights to pharmaceutical developers for up to five
years in countries that had not yet completed the transition to offer
patent protection to pharmaceutical products. 10
Because of their fairly late arrival, regulatory exclusivities
have traditionally been added to patents as an alternative or a
supplemental form of protection.11 Such addition is understandable
(“[T]he … international regime on undisclosed information … is one of the most
significant innovations brought about by the TRIPS Agreement.”); U.N. CONF. ON
TRADE & DEV.–INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. PROJECT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS
AND DEVELOPMENT 522 (2005) [hereinafter TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK] (“TRIPS is
the first international convention specifically imposing obligations on undisclosed
information, including test data.”); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (2001) (noting that the
protection of undisclosed information “has never been the subject of any multilateral
agreement” until the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement). As recounted in the
Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, put together by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development and the International Centre on Trade and
Sustainable Development:
Differences in pre-existing comparative law were even greater
with regard to test data relating to pharmaceuticals and
agrochemicals. Only a few countries had developed rules on the
matter before the negotiation of TRIPS. Thus, the USA introduced
a regulatory data protection regime for pesticides in 1972, and in
1984 adopted regulatory exclusivity provisions for medicines. The
latter provided for five years of exclusivity for new chemical
entities, and three years for data filed in support of authorizations
based on new clinical research relating to chemical entities which
have already been approved for therapeutic use. The [European
Union] member states provided exclusivity protection for the data
filed in support of marketing authorization for pharmaceuticals
since 1987.
TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 8, at 522.
9. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 39.3.
10. Id. art. 70.9; see also U.N. Sec’y-Gen.’s High-Level Panel on Access to
Medicines, Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies, at 17 (Sept.
2016) (“In 1986, when trade negotiations leading to the establishment of the WTO
commenced, 50 countries did not provide patent protection on pharmaceutical
products.”).
11. See Yu, Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 662–64 (discussing
the “question concern[ing] whether data exclusivity protections continue even when
the relevant pharmaceutical product is no longer protected by a patent, such as when
that product is in the public domain or when the previously granted patent has been
subsequently invalidated”).
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considering the different nature of and justifications for this extra layer
of protection.12 While patents focus on inventions that have met the
novelty, non-obviousness, and utility requirements, 13 regulatory
exclusivities target products that do not fit well with, or do not receive
adequate protection from, the patent system. An oft-cited example in
recent years is biological products, which many policymakers,
industry leaders, and commentators have considered insufficiently
protected under existing patent law. 14
While it is easy to understand the concerns about inadequate
protection for pharmaceutical innovations, and the benefits of
advances in medicines and health technologies, the overprotection of
intellectual property rights can greatly reduce public access to
essential medicines. 15 Indeed, the access-to-medicines debate has
remained vibrant and highly contentious since the TRIPS Agreement
entered into force more than two decades ago. Particularly notable are
problems relating to therapeutic treatments for HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa. 16 These problems
12. See Daniel Gervais, The Patent Option, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 357, 357
(2019) (“The patent regime is one-size-fits-all; it protects new, useful, and
nonobvious inventions subject to sufficiency of disclosure. In contrast, the data
exclusivity regime has both a different target (only pharmaceuticals) and purpose
(efficacy and safety).”).
13. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018) (providing the novelty, non-obviousness,
and utility requirements); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 27.1 (“[P]atents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application.”).
14. See Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological
Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV.
419, 450–61 (2012) (discussing why patents may not provide sufficient protection
to biological products); W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs:
Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 527
(2014) (“[T]he public disclosure required by a patent can lower that entry barrier by
providing information about both the biologic-specific manufacturing process and
general manufacturing processes for biologics, making patents particularly
unattractive.”).
15. See Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1563, 1567 n.14 (2013) [hereinafter Yu, Virotech Patents] (collecting
books on the access-to-medicines problems in relation to the TRIPS Agreement).
16. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health of 14 November 2001, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (“We recognize the gravity of the
public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries,
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics.”). See generally THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Obijiofor
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eventually led to the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health 17 in November 2001 and the
introduction of an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement in December
2005. 18 Domestically, the high drug and healthcare costs have also
alarmed the sick, the elderly, and the public at large. 19 It is therefore
no surprise that political debates have prominently featured healthcare
reforms, especially before presidential elections. 20
In view of these ongoing tensions and potential conflicts,
commentators have actively questioned the wisdom of providing
regulatory exclusivities on top of the already very strong protection
for patents under existing law.21 The recent years have also seen
commentators calling on the incentive framework for pharmaceutical
innovation to grant drug developers only one form of protection, but
not both. 22 The potential policy choices—and the need for a deeper
Aginam, John Harrington & Peter K. Yu eds., 2013) (collecting articles that discuss
the access-to-medicines problems in relation to HIV/AIDS).
17. Doha Declaration, supra note 16.
18. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8,
2005); see also Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J.
827, 872–86 (2007) (tracing the development of Article 31bis of the TRIPS
Agreement).
19. See Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 831 (“Due to aging populations
and increasing reliance on prescription drugs, developed countries … face
increasingly ‘strain[ed] government budgets and burden[ed] private health benefits
systems.’” (quoting Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction:
Developments and Trends in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 29 (Pedro Roffe
et al. eds., 2006))).
20. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, U.S. Elections 2020: Understanding What’s at Stake
for Health Care, NPR, Jan. 29, 2020, https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/01/29/800652075/u-s-elections-2020-understanding-whats-at-stake-forhealth-care [https://perma.cc/P4GJ-Z94L] (highlighting the key healthcare issues at
play in the 2020 U.S. presidential election); see also Yu, Virotech Patents, supra
note 15, at 1565 (noting the controversies surrounding Congress’ adoption of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 during the Obama Administration).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 23–30.
22. See ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE
UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 103 (2019) (calling for the
implementation of “a ‘one and done’ principle for the protection of drug
innovation”); Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA
Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399 (2013) (proposing a nonpatent exclusivity system administered by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
to provide incentives in the area of genetic materials); Heled, Patents vs. Statutory
Exclusivities, supra note 14 (questioning the need for and purpose of having both
patents and statutory exclusivities in the area of biological products); Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, supra note 18, at 895 (“If additional incentives
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understanding of the different modalities of protection—provided a
key driving force behind this Symposium.
For instance, John Thomas, who spoke at the opening panel of
this Symposium, explored in an earlier article the implications of the
pharmaceutical industry’s growing preference for regulatory
exclusivities to patent protection.23 Likewise, Robin Feldman
documented the rise of “regulatory property” as a new form of
intellectual property.24 In her latest book, Drugs, Money, and Secret
Handshakes, Professor Feldman called for the implementation of “a
‘one and done’ principle for the protection of drug innovation” that
would require pharmaceutical developers to “choose whether its
period of exclusivity should be a patent, an orphan drug designation,
or a period of data exclusivity for safety and efficacy data, or
something else—but not all of the above and more.” 25 In the area of
genetic materials, Gregory Dolin also proposed a non-patent
exclusivity system administered by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration to generate the incentives that the patent system
traditionally provides. 26 At the international level, Daniel Gervais
advanced an innovative proposal that would extend data exclusivities
if “no patent is applied for or the patentee lets it lapse … [and if an
abridged version of the] clinical data are made available to the
public.” 27
Noting the need for more sophisticated analyses of the
interplay between patents and regulatory exclusivities, Yaniv Heled,
who participated in this Symposium, questioned in prior work the need
for and purpose of having both patents and statutory exclusivities in
the area of biological products.28 In his view, such concurrent
protection will “waste … societal resources” while “giv[ing] rise to
are provided by the data exclusivity regime, one has to wonder whether patent
protection should be weakened proportionally to reflect the additional incentives.”);
Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777,
785 (2010) (“[I]f data exclusivity laws are to be adopted, one has to wonder whether
existing patent rights need to be curtailed proportionally to reflect the additional
incentives.”).
23. John R. Thomas, The End of Patent Medicines: Thoughts on the Rise of
Regulatory Exclusivities, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39 (2015).
24. Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
53 (2016).
25. FELDMAN, supra note 22, at 103.
26. Dolin, supra note 22.
27. Gervais, supra note 12, at 364.
28. Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities, supra note 14.
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unnecessary and avoidable risks of abuse.”29 To alleviate these
shortcomings, policymakers should pay greater attention to the
substitutionary effects of patents and regulatory exclusivities. 30
In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Heled built
on his earlier research on biological products to evaluate the first
decade of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, which
Congress enacted in 2010. 31 Using original data and advancing a new
method for comparing competition in drug markets, this timely article
“surveys the state of competition in United States biologics markets,
entry of follow-on biologics … into these markets, and the effects such
entry has had on biologics prices.” 32 The article laments the statute’s
significant underperformance in comparison with the Hatch–Waxman
Act of 198433 and its “fail[ure] to achieve its goal of significantly
increasing access to biologics in the United States.” 34
Taken together, the scholarship in this area has invited us to
interrogate more deeply the role of patents and regulatory exclusivities
in pharmaceutical innovation and the interplay between these two
forms of protection. As the use of personalized medicines and
biological products becomes more popular and affordable, 35 the
debate on the modalities of protection will only receive more
scholarly, policy, and regulatory attention. At the international level,
this debate will also garner greater interest, due in large part to the
29. Id. at 462 (capitalization omitted); see also Srividhya Ragavan, The Drug
Debate: Data Exclusivity Is the New Way to Delay Generics, 50 CONN. L. REV.
CONNTEMPLATIONS 1, 4 (2018) (“[T]he data exclusivity regime can operate in
parallel with the patent regime to add a layer of protection for the clinical trial
data.”).
30. See CORREA, supra note 8, at 361 (“Data protection systems could, if they
provided exclusivity, become a partial substitute for patent protection.”); Yu, Limits
to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 663 (“For pharmaceutical products that
patent law no longer protects, … data exclusivity law could provide substitutional
protection.”).
31. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010).
32. Yaniv Heled, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act at 10—A
Stocktaking, 7 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 81, 83 (2021) [hereinafter Heled, BPCIA at
10].
33. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, § 156, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 355 (2018)).
34. Heled, BPCIA at 10, supra note 32, at 101.
35. See Yu, Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 689 (“The second
new technological development, which ‘has … revolutionized the healthcare and
pharmaceutical industries,’ is the growing importance and popularity of biologics
and personalized medicines.” (quoting Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 6, at 22)).
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varied developments in different parts of the world and the fact that
many countries are only beginning to focus attention on the
development of biological products.36
III. CHALLENGES
Another key inspiration for this Symposium emerges from the
rapid changes in the domestic and global pharmaceutical landscapes
and the ongoing challenges posed by new geopolitical and
technological developments. The scope and length of this Article do
not allow for an expanded discussion of the myriad challenges that are
now emerging in the domestic and international pharmaceutical
arenas. This Part focuses instead on three sets of primary challenges:
(1) the development of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade
agreements; (2) the emergence of technological advances in
pharmaceutical innovation; and (3) the ongoing and ever-growing
rivalry between China and the United States.
A. Non-multilateral Trade Agreements
The first set of challenges concerns the development of
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements. 37 Particularly
controversial is the aggressive use of these agreements to push for
stronger protections for patents and regulatory exclusivities in the past
two decades. 38 Less than a year before this Symposium, Canada, the
United States, and Mexico signed the United States–Mexico–Canada

36. Cf. WORLD HEALTH ORG., CHINA POLICIES TO PROMOTE LOCAL
PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS AND PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH 19–
21 (2017) [hereinafter WHO CHINA STUDY] (prepared by Frederick Abbott)
(discussing the growing development of biological products in China).
37. For discussions of free trade agreements in the intellectual property context,
see generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
(Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007); Peter K. Yu, The
Non-multilateral Approach to International Intellectual Property Normsetting, in
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 83 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015); Peter K. Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 323, 392–400 (2004).
38. See Yu, Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 672–85 (discussing
the development of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements to
strengthen protection for undisclosed test or other data for agrochemical,
pharmaceutical, and biological products).
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Agreement 39 (“USMCA”), 40 which aimed to replace the North
American Free Trade Agreement. 41 Article 20.48 of the USMCA
provides protection to undisclosed test or other data for
pharmaceutical products “for at least five years from the date of
marketing approval of the new pharmaceutical product in the territory
of the Party.” 42 The provision further enhances the protections for new
clinical information or molecular variations through two alternative
routes. 43 The first route requires signatories to provide protection “for
a period of at least three years with respect to new clinical information
submitted as required in support of a marketing approval of a
previously approved pharmaceutical product covering a new
indication, new formulation, or new method of administration.”44 The
second route allows signatories to offer protection “for a period of at
least five years to new pharmaceutical products that contain a
chemical entity that has not been previously approved in that Party.”45
With respect to undisclosed test or other data for biological
products, Article 20.49 of the now-amended 2018 text provides
protection “for a period of at least ten years from the date of first
marketing approval of that product.”46 This provision states explicitly
that the protection will be extended,
at a minimum, [to] a product that is produced using
biotechnology processes and that is, or contains, a
virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine,
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic
39. United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, Can.–Mex.–U.S., Nov. 30,
2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-statesmexico-canada-agreement [https://perma.cc/5BPT-SQY2] [hereinafter USMCA].
40. For a student note on the UMSCA from a past member of this Journal, see
Jordan Jensen, Note, Biologics Under a New NAFTA: How TPP Fixed NAFTA’s
Intellectual Property Provisions but Not its Investment Provisions, 5 TEX. A&M J.
PROP. L. 247 (2019) (providing an assessment of the USMCA intellectual property
and investment provisions in the area of biological products).
41. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.–Mex.–U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993); see also USMCA, supra note 39, pmbl. (stipulating the objective
of “replac[ing] the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement with a 21st Century,
high standard new agreement to support mutually beneficial trade leading to freer,
fairer markets, and to robust economic growth in the region” (capitalization
omitted)).
42. USMCA, supra note 39, art. 20.48.1(a).
43. Id. art. 20.48.2.
44. Id. art. 20.48.2(a).
45. Id. art. 20.48.2(b).
46. Id. art. 20.49.1.
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product, protein, or analogous product, for use in
human beings for the prevention, treatment, or cure of
a disease or condition.47
Shortly after this Symposium, the USMCA signatories agreed
to amend the agreement by removing Article 20.49 and other
contentious provisions. 48 Such removal addressed the concern U.S.
policymakers had over the agreement’s high protections for biological
products and their request for the United States Trade Representative
to “amend the USMCA to increase competition and enhance patient
access to more affordable prescription drugs,” including biological
products. 49 In the wake of this amendment, the current version of the
USMCA no longer includes language protecting the undisclosed test
or other data for biological products.
Although commentators often criticize bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements for their deleterious effects on
developing countries, it is important to remember that the binding
obligations in these agreements constrain the United States the same
way they constrain other signatories. 50 Because the incentive
framework needed to promote pharmaceutical innovation tends to
vary according to medical needs, market conditions, and technological
advances, what works well for today’s industry may not be suitable in
the future or in the event of a national emergency. A trade agreement
that allows for a limited set of policy options could be detrimental to
the United States because it could easily lock the country into outdated
standards that impede the future development of the local
pharmaceutical industry.51 Such locked-in standards are particularly
47. Id. art. 20.49.2 (footnote omitted).
48. Protocol of Amendment to the Agreement Between the United States of
America, the United Mexican States, and Canada art. 3.E, Can.–Mex.–U.S., Dec.
10, 2019, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/
Protocol-of-Amendments-to-the-United-States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X79R-2RRS].
49. Letter from Representative Jan Schakowsky et al. to Robert E. Lighthizer,
U.S. Trade Representative (July 11, 2019), https://schakowsky.house.gov/sites/
schakowsky.house.gov/files/migrated/uploads/lighthizermeds.pdf [https://perma.
cc/V8JB-88WF].
50. See Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
205, 207 (2006) (“FTA [free trade agreement] obligations, it must be remembered,
generally apply equally to the United States. Thus, it is possible that the United
States could run afoul of its own FTAs.”).
51. See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L.
REV. 975, 1066–70 (2011) (lamenting how the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
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problematic in a fast-growing area like biological products. 52 Should
the United States need to adjust these standards beyond what the
existing agreements permit, it will have to withdraw from those
agreements, ask its trading partners for support to amend the
agreements, or face consequences for noncompliance. 53
B. Technological Advances
The second set of challenges relates to the emergence of
technological advances in pharmaceutical innovation. Part II already
acknowledged the ever-increasing popularity of biological products
and personalized medicines. There are other emergent developments,
however. For example, a fast-growing number of commentators are
now exploring the use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) and machine
learning in the pharmaceutical sector, including for research and
development. 54 Advances in this area have also attracted the attention
Agreement will foreclose opportunities for future legislative reform).
52. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement art. 18.51.3, Feb. 4, 2016,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/
tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/BU94-JYH6] (“Recognising that international and
domestic regulation of new pharmaceutical products that are or contain a biologic is
in a formative stage and that market circumstances may evolve over time ….”).
53. See Chander, supra note 50, at 207 (“Should we conclude in the future that
the [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] anti-circumvention rules [that have been
built into a FTA] are too constricting, we will have to renegotiate the FTA, flout the
FTA, or conform to an uncongenial rule.”).
54. See Pratap Khedkar & Dharmendra Sahay, Trends in Healthcare and
Medical Innovation, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019: CREATING HEALTHY
LIVES—THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 87, 89 (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds.,
2019) [hereinafter GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019] (“A third of all AI
investments in healthcare are projected to be in drug discovery, specifically using
computer simulation to find better molecules faster. Companies are also beginning
to leverage AI and data to reduce clinical trial costs and waste, though progress has
been slower than desired.” (footnote omitted)); WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL.,
PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION:
INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE
89 (2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter TRILATERAL STUDY] (“Artificial neural networks …
have been used in drug discovery for screening compounds in the automated design
of new classes of medicines and in finding novel uses for known medicines…. AI is
already being used in the design and analysis of clinical trials.”). For the use of
artificial intelligence and machine learning in the health area, see generally Ma
Huateng, Tencent, Application of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in China’s
Healthcare Services, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019, supra, at 103 (2019);
ERIC J. TOPOL, DEEP MEDICINE: HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAN MAKE
HEALTHCARE HUMAN AGAIN (2019); David W. Opderbeck, Artificial Intelligence
in Pharmaceuticals, Biologics, and Medical Devices: Present and Future
Regulatory Models, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (2019); W. Nicholson Price II,
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of those involved in compiling the Global Innovation Index, who
selected the future of medical innovation as the theme of their 2019
report.55
In addition, big data analytics have already “transformed the
fields of biotechnology and bioinformatics while ushering in major
advances in drug development, clinical practices, and medical
financing.” 56 With increased data value, pharmaceutical developers
understandably will want stronger protection for their undisclosed test
or other data. After all, the more protection they secure, the more value
they can extract from the data and the more lead time they will have
for such extraction.57 Moreover, the use of big data analytics in the
pharmaceutical sector may require the provision of new incentives to
motivate drug developers to upgrade their legacy technologies and to
invest in new analytical tools to optimize innovation, improve clinical
trial efficiency, and strengthen product quality, safety, and efficacy. 58
Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65 (2019); W. Nicholson
Price II & Arti K. Rai, Clearing Opacity Through Machine Learning, 106 IOWA L.
REV. 775 (2021).
55. GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019, supra note 54.
56. Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 6, at 22; see also Ryan Abbott, Big Data
and Pharmacovigilance: Using Health Information Exchanges to Revolutionize
Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225, 227 (2013) (noting that “‘big data’ is altering
new drug development, clinical practices, and health care financing”); Sam F.
Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem: Intellectual Property Incentives, Market
Exclusivity, and the Future of New Medicines, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 32–34
(2018) (discussing the use of big data and in silico screening of chemical
compounds); Jamie Cattell et al., How Big Data Can Revolutionize Pharmaceutical
R&D, MCKINSEY & CO. (Apr. 2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/
pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/how-big-data-canrevolutionize-pharmaceutical-r-and-d [https://perma.cc/X3H5-7STE] (“In research
and development … big data and analytics are being adopted across industries,
including pharmaceuticals.”).
57. Extracting value from these data can be complicated, as a substantial portion
of the value derives from the reuse, or initially unintended use, of the data. See Mark
Burdon & Mark Andrejevic, Big Data in the Sensor Society, in BIG DATA IS NOT A
MONOLITH 61, 69 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto et al. eds., 2016) (noting that the value in
data “is provided by the fact that personal data can be aggregated with that of
countless other users (and things) in order to unearth unanticipated but actionable
research findings”); VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK AND THINK
153 (2014) (“[I]n a big-data age, most innovative secondary uses haven’t been
imagined when the data is first collected.”); Margaret Foster Riley, Big Data,
HIPAA, and the Common Rule: Time for Big Change?, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW,
AND BIOETHICS 251, 251 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018) (“The analysis of Big
Data related to healthcare is often for a different purpose than the purpose for which
the data were originally collected.”).
58. See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine,

14

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 7

These costly investments, in turn, will generate a new cycle of
demands for stronger data protection to help recoup the developers’
up-front investments. 59 In responding to these demands, policymakers
should exercise caution, as overprotection could fragment the data
market and thereby undermine the benefits of new, innovative data
analytical techniques. 60
C. U.S.–China Rivalry
The final set of challenges pertains to the ongoing and evergrowing rivalry between China and the United States. Although
intellectual property problems in China have been the subject of a
37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401 (2016) (calling for the building of infrastructure for
transformative medical innovation to provide incentives for developing personalized
medicine and related diagnostic tests and algorithms); Cattell et al., supra note 56
(estimating that the application of big-data strategies “to better inform decision
making could generate up to $100 billion in value annually across the US healthcare system, by optimizing innovation, improving the efficiency of research and
clinical trials, and building new tools for physicians, consumers, insurers, and
regulators to meet the promise of more individualized approaches”); Megan Nichols,
5 Ways Big Data Is Transforming the Pharmaceutical Industry, GEEKTIME (May 8,
2017), https://perma.cc/FJF6-SYHN (“Using Big Data and predictive analysis,
companies can conduct effective clinical trials. The patients selected for these trials
can meet certain prerequisites found through multiple databases, and researchers can
monitor the participants in real-time.”).
59. See Nichols, supra note 58 (“Cost is one of the largest factors in the slow
growth and acceptance of Big Data analytics in the pharmaceutical industry. It’s
expensive to overhaul an entire infrastructure, so many companies are breaking
changes down into small compartments in order of priority.”); Yu, Limits to TRIPS
Harmonization, supra note 6, at 687–88 (“With … costly expenditures [in upgrading
technology and investing in new analytical tools], one can only assume that private
industries would want stronger protection of their proprietary data to help recoup
those up-front investments.”).
60. See Josef Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data:
Between Propertisation and Access, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM.
L. 257, 260 & n.16 (2017) (considering “multiple ownership of the same data with
considerable negative effects on access to that data” as “a situation of a ‘tragedy of
the anti-commons’ in which too many property rights in the same asset lead to
inefficient underuse of that asset”); Wolfgang Kerber, A New (Intellectual) Property
Right for Non-Personal Data? An Economic Analysis, 2016 GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INT] 989, 990
(positing that the introduction of new intellectual property right in data “can be …
dangerous for innovation and competition in the digital economy, because it might
lead to considerable legal uncertainty, the monopolisation of information, and
impediments for the free flow of data that is so crucial for the digital economy”);
Peter K. Yu, Data Producer’s Right and the Protection of Machine-Generated Data,
93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 889 (2019) (noting that the fragmentation of the data market
could “undermin[e] the benefits of new, innovative data analytical techniques”).
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perennial debate,61 and continue to attract attention from U.S.
policymakers, 62 the fast-escalating trade war between the two
countries has generated new tensions and conflicts that we have not
seen since the mid-1990s. 63 A few months before this Symposium,
China and the United States threatened each other with tens or
hundreds of billions of dollars in trade tariffs. 64 As partial relief, these
countries signed the so-called “Phase One” agreement in January
61. For the Author’s earlier discussions of the piracy and counterfeiting
problems in China, see generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic
Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPSPLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to
Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-first Century, 50
AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners I]; Peter K.
Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in PostWTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006); Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and
the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 209 (2011).
62. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE
INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER
SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018) (providing the final report of the
Section 301 investigation on Chinese laws, policies, and practices in the areas of
intellectual property, innovation, and technology development); OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UPDATE CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND
PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
INNOVATION (2018) (providing an update to the earlier report); Request for
Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures Concerning the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23, 2018)
(providing the United States’ second WTO complaint against China that focused
primarily on the violation of the TRIPS Agreement).
63. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 61, at 154, 170 (discussing
the high U.S.–China tensions in the mid-1990s when the United States dispatched
an aircraft carrier group to the Taiwan Strait following a large-scale Chinese naval
exercise and when the United States mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade, Serbia).
64. See, e.g., Trump: U.S. Will Hit $300 Billion Worth of Chinese Goods with
10% Tariff, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tradechina-tariffs/trump-says-u-s-to-hit-300-billion-worth-of-chinese-goods-with-10tariff-idUSKCN1UR5CK [https://perma.cc/S4DW-DDZG] (announcing the
imposition of an additional 10% tariff on $300 billion worth of Chinese imports); Se
Young Lee & Judy Hua, China Strikes Back at U.S. with New Tariffs on $75 Billion
in Goods, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tradechina/china-strikes-back-at-us-with-new-tariffs-on-75-billion-in-goodsidUSKCN1VD1AJ [https://perma.cc/KK6H-9FN6] (announcing the imposition of
an additional 10% retaliatory tariffs on $75 billion worth of U.S. imports); see also
Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, The US–China Trade War: A Timeline,
CHINA BRIEFING (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-uschina-trade-war-a-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/3GN3-CEJA] (providing an updated
timeline of these tariffs).
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2020. 65 At the signing of the agreement, some trade experts already
noted the unrealistic nature of some commitment targets. 66 With the
changing circumstances precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, it
has become even more unlikely that the agreement will be fully
implemented. 67
As far as pharmaceutical innovation is concerned, the rivalry
between China and the United States is important for three reasons.
First, China is, at present, the world’s leading supplier of active
pharmaceutical ingredients (“APIs”). 68 It also has the world’s second
largest pharmaceutical market69 while producing about four percent of
65. Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, China–
U.S.,
Jan.
15,
2020,
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongoliataiwan/peoples-republic-china/phase-one-trade-agreement/text
[https://perma.cc/LP3S-M3AB].
66. See Jason Bordoff, Trump’s China Trade Deal Is as Dead as Can Be His
Much-Touted Trade Victory Has Crashed and Burned with the Coronavirus
Pandemic,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(May
22,
2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/trump-trade-deal-china-dead-coronaviruspandemic/ [https://perma.cc/G7TV-LB3C] (“The targets [for the Phase One U.S.–
China trade deal] were unrealistic even before the ink was dry in January.”); David
Lawder & Andrea Shalal, China to Ramp up U.S. Buys Under Trade Deal, but
Skeptics
Question
Targets,
REUTERS
(Jan.
13,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china/china-to-ramp-up-u-s-buysunder-trade-deal-but-skeptics-question-targets-idUSKBN1ZD0FN
[https://perma.cc/5DHE-TK63] (“[S]ome U.S. trade experts call [China’s pledge to
buy almost $80 billion of additional manufactured goods from the United States over
the next two years] an unrealistic target ….”).
67. See Bordoff, supra note 66 (“Amid the collapse in oil demand and prices
unleashed by the pandemic, it is now all but certain that China will fail to meet its
targets for energy purchases.”); Yen Nee Lee, China’s Purchases of US Goods Will
Fall Way Short of “Phase One” Trade Deal Due to the Coronavirus, Says Think
Tank, CNBC (May 11, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/11/coronavirus-usexports-to-china-to-fall-short-of-phase-one-trade-deal-says-csis.html
[https://perma.cc/SQ3K-AELE] (reporting the forecast of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies that “[t]he coronavirus pandemic will cause China’s
purchases of U.S. goods [in 2020] to fall way short of what was agreed to in the
‘phase one’ trade deal”).
68. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective
Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 363 (2008) (“[China] already is the world’s largest
producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients and is likely to be a very important
player in the generic market.”); see also WHO CHINA STUDY, supra note 36, at 17
(“China is the world’s leading producer and exporter of [APIs] by volume,
accounting for 20% of total global API output. China produces over 2000 API drug
products, with annual production capacity exceeding 2 million tons.” (footnote
omitted)).
69. See Issaku Harada, China Extends Drug Patents to 25 Years, NIKKEI ASIAN
REV. (May 16, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-extends-drug-patents-
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the world’s new pharmaceutical products. 70 Indeed, the country’s fastexpanding role in the global pharmaceutical landscape has sparked
major concerns among U.S. policymakers and the American public. In
China Rx, Rosemary Gibson and Janardan Prasad Singh warned about
the increasing risks of the United States’ growing dependence on the
global supply chain for pharmaceutical products and vitamins on the
APIs originating in China.71 In the past few months, those worrying
about the potential shortages of medicines amid the COVID-19
pandemic also lamented the country’s continuous and increasing
dependence on Chinese pharmaceutical products and ingredients. 72 It
is therefore no surprise that the U.S. administration—and, for that
matter, other governments—has now actively pushed for nationalist
policies to address the global pandemic. The next Part will discuss this
problematic approach in greater detail. 73
Second, since the mid-2000s, China’s intellectual property
laws and policies in the pharmaceutical sector have undergone radical
to-25-years [https://perma.cc/QS2S-5Q8F] (“China’s pharmaceutical market is now
worth more than $120 billion, second only to America’s.”).
70. See CHINA PHARM. ENTERS. ASS’N ET AL., FOSTERING A SUSTAINABLE
ECOSYSTEM
FOR
DRUG
INNOVATION
IN
CHINA
3
(2016),
http://enadmin.rdpac.org/upload/upload_file/1577873373.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UE2Q-ZT4K] (“Measured by the number of pipeline drugs and
new drugs launched, China is in the third tier, contributing around 4% to global drug
innovations, lagging far behind the first tier[,] the US (~50%)[,] and countries in the
second tier such as the UK and Japan.”); Ma, supra note 54, at 108 (“China has
independently researched and developed new drugs in recent years that have
contributed about 4% to the global novel drug market, approximately one-twelfth of
the contribution from that of the United States of America.”).
71. ROSEMARY GIBSON & JANARDAN PRASAD SINGH, CHINA RX: EXPOSING THE
RISKS OF AMERICA’S DEPENDENCE ON CHINA FOR MEDICINE (2018).
72. See Ana Swanson, Coronavirus Spurs U.S. Efforts to End China’s
TIMES
(Mar.
11,
2020),
Chokehold
on
Drugs,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/business/economy/coronavirus-china-trumpdrugs.html [https://perma.cc/A8BG-EHTC] (“The global spread of the coronavirus
is reigniting efforts by the Trump administration to encourage more American
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and reduce dependence on China for the drugs
and medical products that fuel the federal health care system.”); Guy Taylor, “WakeUp Call”: Chinese Control of U.S. Pharmaceutical Supplies Sparks Growing
Concern,
WASH.
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2020),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/17/china-threatens-restrictcritical-drug-exports-us/ [https://perma.cc/FWS5-5Z2R] (“With the coronavirus
crisis threatening to strain the U.S. government’s large stockpiles of such drugs,
health experts warn that China’s own outbreak and related societal shutdown could
mean major shortages ahead as Chinese factories struggle to keep up production of
the APIs.”).
73. See discussion infra Part IV.
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transformations. Although the country declined to offer patent
protection to pharmaceutical products when it adopted the first
modern patent law in 1984 and has remained reluctant to strengthen
protections in the two ensuing decades, 74 China took an “innovative
turn” in the mid-2010s, shortly after its State Council adopted the
National Intellectual Property Strategy. 75 By now, it is quite clear that
China is no longer content with being the world’s leading API supplier
but also “wants to develop a research-based pharmaceutical
industry.” 76
A case in point is the draft Provisional Measures for the
Implementation of Test Data Protection for Pharmaceutical Products,
which the National Medical Products Administration of China
released in April 2018.77 The proposed Article 5 not only provides six
years of protection to data submitted for the regulatory approval of
innovative drugs (chuangxin yao) 78—a TRIPS-plus standard that
China accepted upon WTO accession 79—but the provision also offers
twelve years of protection to undisclosed test or other data for
74. See Peter K. Yu, China’s Innovative Turn and the Changing Pharmaceutical
Landscape, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 593, 596–98 (2020) [hereinafter Yu, China’s
Innovative Turn] (discussing China’s reluctance to strengthen patent protection for
pharmaceutical products in the 1980s and 1990s).
75. See id. at 594 (“Since the mid-2000s, China has taken an innovative turn that
has serious ramifications for the global pharmaceutical landscape and future
developments at the intersection of intellectual property and public health.”); see
also Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual
Property System, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1079–87 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, A HalfCentury of Scholarship] (discussing the State Council’s adoption of the National
Intellectual Property Strategy and China’s innovative turn).
76. Yu, Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, supra note 6, at 693–94.
77. Provisional Measures for the Implementation of Test Data Protection for
Pharmaceutical Products, https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/draftdata
exclusivityrules.doc [https://perma.cc/3YFE-SURG] (China) (in Chinese)
[hereinafter Provisional Measures]; see also Mark Cohen, Draft of Data Exclusivity
Rules
Released
by
CFDA,
CHINA
IPR
(Apr.
26,
2018),
https://chinaipr.com/2018/04/26/draft-of-data-exclusivity-rules-released-by-cfda/
[https://perma.cc/963J-6U5E] (outlining the changes brought about by these
provisional measures). The National Medical Products Administration of China is
the successor to the Food and Drug Administration of China.
78. Provisional Measures, supra note 77, art. 5.
79. See World Trade Org., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
China ¶ 284, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001) (committing to the
“introduction and enactment of laws and regulations to make sure that no person,
other than the person who submitted such data, could, without the permission of the
person who submitted the data, rely on such data in support of an application for
product approval for a period of at least six years from the date on which China
granted marketing approval to the person submitting the data”).
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innovative therapeutic biologics (chuangxin zhiliao yong shengwu
zhipin).80 This twelve-year standard will put China in parity with the
United States.81 It will also be “higher than the standard laid down in
even the most aggressive TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral agreements.”82
Finally, the recent years have seen China playing important
roles in pushing for the greater use and development of artificial
intelligence and machine learning in the health arena. 83 As Tencent
CEO Ma Huateng observed in the Global Innovation Index 2019
report:
Th[e] growth in national health expenditures is creating
opportunities for medical AI in China. According to
Tractica’s forecast, China’s AI medical market is
developing rapidly, with the market size soaring from
9.661 billion yuan in 2016, and 13.65 billion yuan in
2017, to 20.4 billion yuan in 2018, maintaining a
compound annual growth rate of more than 40%. At
the same time, Chinese medical institutions and
businesses are taking a proactive attitude towards AI.
Nearly 80% of hospitals and medical companies are
planning to, or already have, carried out medical AI
applications and more than 75% of hospitals believe
that such applications will become popular in the
future.84
In terms of health patent publications, the Global Innovation Index
2019 placed China among the top three in the world in biotechnology,
pharmaceuticals, and medical technology based on publications from
2010 to 2017. 85 From 1985 to 2017, “China ranked fourth in the total
80. Provisional Measures, supra note 77, art. 5.
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018) (providing twelve years of protection
to undisclosed test or other data for biological products).
82. Yu, China’s Innovative Turn, supra note 74, at 607.
83. See generally LEE KAI-FU, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND
THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2018) (discussing the development relating to artificial
intelligence in China).
84. Ma, supra note 54, at 103 (footnote omitted); see also Yu, Data Exclusivities,
supra note 6, at 22 (“The introduction of big data analytics has transformed the fields
of biotechnology and bioinformatics while ushering in major advances in drug
development, clinical practices, and medical financing.”).
85. Soumitra Dutta et al., The Global Innovation Index 2019, in GLOBAL
INNOVATION INDEX 2019, supra note 54, at 1, 48.
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number of healthcare AI patent applications filed, contributing to 12%
of the total.”86 In 2016, China already “surpassed Japan and the
European Union to become the world’s second largest healthcare AI
applicant …, which reflects the strong momentum of medical
technology innovation in China.” 87
IV. POSSIBILITIES
After discussing the motivations behind this Symposium, this
Part turns to a key goal of the event and this special issue. In addition
to taking stock of the legal developments concerning pharmaceutical
innovation, which Parts II and III have examined, the Symposium’s
organizing team also wants to explore new issues and models that are
now emerging at the frontier of the debate at the intersection of
intellectual property and public health. For this exploration, we are
fortunate to have two highly interesting articles: one on
biopharmaceutical standards and the other on vaccine development.
In his article, Jorge Contreras examined the issue of patent
disclosure in the standard-setting context,88 which is underexplored in
the intellectual property literature. Using the case of Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 89 this
article draws valuable lessons from the “global standards wars” and
the more than three decades of litigation in the information and
communication technology sector. 90 The article shows that “issues
surrounding the acquisition and disclosure of patents claiming
standardized technologies have more salience in the biopharma sector
than commonly believed.”91 It further calls on “standards
organizations operating in the biopharma sector [to] ensure that their
86. Ma, supra note 54, at 104.
87. Id.
88. Jorge L. Contreras, Is Biopharma Ready for the Standards Wars?, 7 TEX.
A&M J. PROP. L. 43, 45 (2021) [hereinafter Contreras, Standards Wars].
89. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 457 F. App’x 929 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 258
(D. Mass. 2018); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d
184 (D. Mass. 2011).
90. Jorge L. Contreras, The Global Standards Wars: Patent and Competition
Disputes in North America, Europe and Asia (Univ. of Utah, S.J. Quinney Coll. of
L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 353, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3106090 [https://perma.cc/4RZB-VV5Q].
91. Contreras, Standards Wars, supra note 88, at 79.
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policies and procedures are robust enough to delineate clearly the
obligations of participants with respect to patents covering
standardized technologies.” 92
The second article93 comes from Ana Santos Rutschman, who
has written actively in the area of vaccine development long before the
COVID-19 pandemic, covering issues relating to the Ebola, Zika, and
other viral outbreaks.94 Her contribution to this Symposium identifies
vaccines in two different types of markets—what she calls “happy
markets” and “unhappy markets.” 95 Given the different market
conditions for vaccine development, she invites us to explore whether
the rights arising out of vaccine patents can be better interpreted or
enforced through a non-property-centric lens. 96 The article
specifically calls for the creation of “a liability regime for critical
components of vaccine technology” to help “remove some of the most
salient transactional obstacles to the development and
commercialization of new and better vaccines.” 97
While these two contributions help us explore emergent issues
and models at the frontier of the pharmaceutical innovation debate, the
remainder of this Part will be devoted to a recent event that the
Symposium organizers and participants did not anticipate: the
COVID-19 pandemic. 98 Issues sparked by this pandemic are not only
timely but also relevant and important to this Symposium, for three
92. Id.
93. Ana Santos Rutschman, Property and Intellectual Property in Vaccine
Markets, 7 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 110 (2021) [hereinafter Rutschman, Vaccine
Markets].
94. See GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE AFTER EBOLA (Sam F.
Halabi et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS
DISEASE] (discussing the Ebola outbreak and its aftermath); Ana Santos Rutschman,
IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200, 1218–43 (2018)
(discussing the Ebola and Zika outbreaks); Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine
Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729, 734–50 (2019) (tracing the historical
development of the race to develop new vaccines); Ana Santos Rutschman, Vaccine
Licensure in the Public Interest: Lessons from the Development of the U.S. Army
Zika Vaccine, 127 YALE L.J. F. 651 (2018) (discussing the Zika outbreak).
95. Rutschman, Vaccine Markets, supra note 93, at 113–18.
96. See id. at 130–31.
97. Id. at 111.
98. For discussions of legal issues in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, see
generally ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19 (Scott Burris et al. eds.,
2020); Symposium, Taming COVID-19 by Regulation, 11 EUR. J. RISK REG. 187
(2020); Symposium, The International Legal Order and the Global Pandemic, 114
AM. J. INT’L L. 571 (2020).
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reasons. First, they push us to think deeper about the role of patents,
regulatory exclusivities, and other incentive frameworks in promoting
pharmaceutical innovation. As the proverb goes, necessity is the
mother of invention. COVID-19 has presented an unprecedented
opportunity to explore the possibilities both within and outside the
intellectual property system. 99 Second, the issues are relevant to the
debate in this Symposium because they make salient the nexus
between the domestic and international debates and between theory
and practice in the area of pharmaceutical innovation. As we have seen
firsthand from the ongoing development surrounding the COVID-19
vaccines and treatments, this nexus deserves urgent scholarly and
policy attention. Finally, issues relating to the pandemic have involved
quite a number of participants to this Symposium. In a way, they
provide vivid examples of intellectual property scholarship in action.
Although the origin of SARS-CoV-2—the coronavirus that
causes the COVID-19 disease 100—remains a mystery, there is a
general consensus that the first viral outbreak occurred in Wuhan,
China, at the end of 2019.101 Since then, the virus spread to Europe,
the United States, and other parts of the world in multiple directions.102
In late January 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”)
99. See ANDREW T. PRICE-SMITH, CONTAGION AND CHAOS: DISEASE, ECOLOGY,
AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 211 (2009) (“Contagion

often proves disruptive to societies, and it is extremely problematic for governance,
but it may result in the production of ingenuity that allows societies, economies, and
structures of governance to switch to new modes of operation.”); E. Richard Gold,
The Coronavirus Pandemic Has Shattered the Status Quo on Drug Development.
We Should Build on That, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2020, 6:30 AM),
https://fortune.com/2020/03/26/coronavirus-vaccine-drug-development-openscience-covid-19-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/66DN-34Q6] (“The COVID-19
pandemic shattered th[e] status quo [on drug development].”).
100. The full name of SARS-CoV-2 is “severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2.” Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus That
Causes It, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novelcoronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it [https://perma.cc/JRC7-8XE7] (last visited Oct.
7, 2020).
101. Press Release, World Health Org., Pneumonia of Unknown Cause—China
Disease Outbreak News (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/ [https://perma.cc/9CBA-N3PB].
102. See WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on
COVID-19—11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarksat-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020
[https://perma.cc/4R5NKG3B] [hereinafter WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks] (“There are now
more than 118,000 cases in 114 countries, and 4,291 people have lost their lives.”).
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declared COVID-19 “a public health emergency of international
concern.” 103 Two months later, on March 11, the international health
body classified it as a global pandemic.104 To prevent the community
spread of the coronavirus, national and sub-national governments
throughout the world began imposing stay-home or safer-at-home
orders, physical distancing recommendations, travel restrictions, and
other public health measures. 105
In response to this global pandemic, international
intergovernmental bodies quickly mobilized to coordinate efforts to
promote access to vaccines, diagnostic kits, therapeutic treatments,
medical devices, and other health technologies. For instance, WHO
Director General Tedros Ghebreyesus asked “all countries, companies
and research institutions to support open data, open science and open
collaboration so that all people can enjoy the benefits of science and
research.” 106 Likewise, Francis Gurry, the Director General of the
103. WHO Director-General’s Statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statement-on-ihremergency-committee-on-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov) [https://perma.cc/M9P4T8A2].
104. See WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks, supra note 102 (“We have
… made the assessment that COVID-19 can be characterized as a pandemic.”); see
also Jamie Ducharme, World Health Organization Declares COVID-19 a
“Pandemic.” Here’s What That Means, TIME (Mar. 11, 2020, 12:39 PM),
https://time.com/5791661/who-coronavirus-pandemic-declaration/ [https://
perma.cc/E2XW-CPV8]. (reporting WHO’s pandemic declaration).
105. See TRILATERAL STUDY, supra note 54, at 17 (“Governments around the
globe have implemented restrictions to economic and social activities in an effort to
slow the virus’s spread, including through policies of confinement, physical
distancing and restrictions on travel.”). As researchers from the Center for Public
Health Law Research at Temple University Beasley School of Law recounted in
relation to the United States:
On March 19, 2020, California started a trend of statewide stayat-home orders. Within the subsequent two weeks, 32 more states
and the District of Columbia issued statewide stay-at-home orders
…. [T]he remaining six states implemented stay-at-home orders
by April 7, 2020, while Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming never issued explicit
statewide stay-at-home orders as of July 1, 2020.
Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State, and Local
Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note
98, at 10, 12.
106. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on
COVID-19—6 April 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarksat-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---6-april-2020 [https://perma.cc/C87Q-A7YJ].
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World Intellectual Property Organization, issued a public statement
noting that “emergencies and catastrophes may call for measures that
may disrupt the normal functioning of the incentive framework upon
which the [intellectual property] system is based.” 107 In addition, the
United Nations General Assembly issued a resolution
[e]ncourag[ing] Member States to work in partnership
with all relevant stakeholders to increase research and
development funding for vaccines and medicines,
leverage digital technologies, and strengthen scientific
international cooperation necessary to combat COVID19 and to bolster coordination … towards rapid
development, manufacturing and distribution of
diagnostics, antiviral medicines, personal protective
equipment and vaccines. 108
The WHO also worked closely with France, other members of the
European Union, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to launch
the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator, which “brings together
governments, scientists, businesses, civil society, and philanthropists
and global health organizations … to support[] the development and
equitable distribution of the tests, treatments and vaccines the world
needs to reduce mortality and severe disease.” 109
At the national level, countries quickly adopted new
legislation, resolutions, or government decrees to increase the use of
flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement, such as the issuance
of compulsory licenses under Article 31110 and the utilization of the
national security exception under Article 73. 111 In March 2020, Israel
107. Francis Gurry, Some Considerations on Intellectual Property, Innovation,
Access and COVID-19, ¶ 5, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dg_gurry/news/2020/news_0025.html
[https://perma.cc/92K2-ZRHA].
108. International Cooperation to Ensure Global Access to Medicines, Vaccines
and Medical Equipment to Face COVID-19, ¶ 3, G.A. Res. 74/274, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/74/274 (Apr. 20, 2020).
109. The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator
[https://perma.cc/PM4H-VBP4]
(last visited Aug. 23, 2020).
110. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 31 (delineating the complex
conditions for the use of patents without the right holder’s authorization).
111. See id. art. 73(b) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed … to
prevent a Member from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests … in time of … emergency in
international relations ….”); see also Letter from Carlos Correa, Executive Dir., S.
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became the first country to introduce a compulsory license during the
global pandemic.112 A few months later, the European Parliament
adopted a nonbinding resolution “[c]alling on the [European]
Commission and the [European Union] Member States to formally
support the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP), allowing
maximum sharing of COVID-19 health technology-related
knowledge, intellectual property and data to the benefit of all countries
and citizens.” 113 Meanwhile, government agencies, private businesses,
and not-for-profit organizations launched proactive initiatives to
facilitate domestic and international cooperation, ranging from the
issuance of open licenses 114 to the release of COVID-19 Open
Research Dataset 115 to public pledges of patented technologies and
other intellectual properties.116
In academic and policy circles, commentators advanced
innovative proposals to help governments and intergovernmental
Ctr., to Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen. of the World Health Org., Francis
Gurry, Dir.-Gen. of the World Intellectual Property Org., and Roberto Azevêdo,
Dir.-Gen. of the World Trade Org. (Apr. 4, 2020) (“The use of [Article 73] will be
fully justified to procure medical products and devices or to use the technologies to
manufacture them as necessary to address the current health emergency.”); Frederick
Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement Article 73 Security Exceptions and the COVID-19
Pandemic (S. Ctr., Rsch. Paper No. 116, 2020) (discussing the use of Article 73 in
the COVID-19 context).
112. See Adam Houldsworth, The Key Covid-19 Compulsory Licensing
Developments So
Far,
IAM (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.iammedia.com/coronavirus/the-key-covid-19-compulsory-licensing-developments-sofar [https://perma.cc/S2L8-PVLJ] (“The only country in which a Covid-19-related
compulsory licence has been granted so far is Israel.”). This license sought to import
a generic version of AbbVie’s Kaletra (lopinavir/ritonavir) from India for treating
COVID-19 patients. Id.
113. European Parliament Resolution on the EU’s Public Health Strategy PostCOVID-19, art. 6, 2020/2691(RSP) (July 10, 2020).
114. See Publishers Make Coronavirus (COVID-19) Content Freely Available
and Reusable, WELLCOME (Mar. 16, 2020), https://wellcome.ac.uk/pressrelease/publishers-make-coronavirus-covid-19-content-freely-available-andreusable (stating that leading publishers made coronavirus-related works freely
available).
115. See Press Release, White House Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y, Call to Action to
the Tech Community on New Machine Readable COVID-19 Dataset (Mar. 16,
2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/call-action-techcommunity-new-machine-readable-covid-19-dataset/
[https://perma.cc/GW8SQ8WJ] (announcing the joint effort of the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy, the Allen Institute for AI, the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative,
Georgetown University, Microsoft, and the National Institutes of Health to release
the COVID-19 Open Research Dataset).
116. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 150–154 (discussing the Open
COVID pledge).
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bodies to reduce the barriers that the intellectual property system may
pose to efforts addressing the global pandemic. For example,
Frederick Abbott and Jerome Reichman proposed legal measures on
both the supply and demand sides to promote the “equitable access to
vaccines, treatments, diagnostics and medical equipment.” 117 Teresa
Hackett underscored the important roles played by text and data
mining and the right to research during the global pandemic. 118 Yaniv
Heled, Ana Santos Rutschman, and Liza Vertinsky called for
intellectual property law to incorporate the tort law privileges of selfdefense and necessity. 119 Joshua Sarnoff advocated the development
of a more robust legal right to repair and produce the needed medical
equipment, spare parts, and products in emergencies. 120
While most of these developments have been promising and
have greatly enhanced domestic and international cooperation, some
countries took a different route and opted instead for nationalist
pandemic responses. Their choices have raised concerns throughout
the world, especially among developing countries. For instance, the
Trump Administration has been widely criticized for banning the
export of personal protective equipment to other countries, including
those that were struggling with similar public health crises. 121 The
117. Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, Facilitating Access to CrossBorder Supplies of Patented Pharmaceuticals: The Case of the COVID-19
Pandemic, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 535 (2020).
118. Teresa Hackett, COVID and Copyright: The Right to Research, ELEC. INFO.
FOR LIBR. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.eifl.net/blogs/covid-and-copyright-rightresearch [https://perma.cc/C48A-BP9V].
119. Yaniv Heled et al., The Need for the Tort Law Privileges of Self-Defense and
Necessity
in
Intellectual
Property
Law
(July
3,
2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3642833 [https://perma.cc/K7WA-J984].
120. Joshua D. Sarnoff, TRIPS, COVID-19, and the Right to Repair and Produce
Needed Medical Products in Emergencies (Part 1 of 2), TRADERX REPORT (June
11, 2020), https://www.traderxreport.com/covid-19/trips-covid-19-and-the-right-torepair-and-produce-needed-medical-products-in-emergencies-part-1-of-2/
[https://perma.cc/M9M8-TLQ6]; Joshua D. Sarnoff, TRIPS, COVID-19 and the
Right to Repair and Produce Needed Medical Products in Emergencies (Part 2 of
2), TRADERX REPORT, (June 11, 2020), https://www.traderxreport.com/covid19/trips-covid-19-and-the-right-to-repair-and-produce-needed-medical-productsin-emergencies-part-2-of-2/ [https://perma.cc/J36E-UCND].
121. See Ana Swanson et al., Trump Seeks to Block 3M Mask Exports and Grab
Masks from Its Overseas Customers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-3mmasks.html [https://perma.cc/53W5-H3JN] (reporting that “the administration is
invoking the [Defense Production Act] to compel 3M to send to the United States
masks made in factories overseas and to stop exporting masks the company
manufactures in the United States”).
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administration also has embraced a “go it alone” approach to
developing COVID-19 vaccines and treatments. 122 Not only did
President Trump refuse to join other world leaders “in a virtual
summit … to pledge billions of dollars to quickly develop vaccines
and drugs to fight the coronavirus,”123 but the United States also
declined to participate in the COVAX Initiative, which aims to
provide fair and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines throughout
the world and which will be further discussed below. 124
Although the Trump administration’s highly controversial
instruction of 3M and other companies not to export personal
protective equipment has received wide media coverage, 125 the United
States is not the only country that has taken a nationalist stand during
the global pandemic. According to the Global Trade Alert project at
122. As a Congressional Research Service report declared:
In May 2020, the Trump Administration announced the creation
of a program called Operation Warp Speed, which seeks to use
coordinated government support to accelerate the development,
manufacturing, and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and other
medical countermeasures. With respect to vaccines, the program
initially selected fourteen promising candidates, which are being
narrowed down to “about seven.” Under Operation Warp Speed,
the federal government is investing in scaling up manufacturing
and distribution for selected COVID-19 vaccine candidates “at
risk” (that is, before safety and efficacy is demonstrated). Under
the program, [the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority] has entered into agreements to accelerate
the development and manufacturing—and to purchase hundreds
of millions of doses—for vaccine candidates being developed by
AstraZeneca and the University of Oxford, Sanofi and
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Pfizer and BioNTech, Moderna and
NIAID, Novavax, and Johnson & Johnson. By November 2020,
three of the manufacturers participating in Operation Warp
Speed—Pfizer/BioNTech,
Moderna/NIAID,
and
AstraZeneca/University of Oxford—announced encouraging
safety and efficacy results from the Phase 3 trials of their vaccines.
KEVIN J. HICKEY & ERIN H. WARD, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46399, LEGAL ISSUES IN
COVID-19 VACCINE DEVELOPMENT 1, 1–2 (2020) (footnotes omitted).
123. William Booth et al., U.S. Skips Virtual Vaccine Summit as World Leaders
Pledge Billions to Efforts, WASH. POST, May 5, 2020, at A1.
124. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 155–163 (discussing the
COVAX Initiative).
125. See Anya van Wagtendonk, A White House Order to Keep Masks in the US
Could Limit Supply, Companies Warn, VOX (Apr. 4, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/4/4/21208142/coronavirus-ppeexports-masks-dpa-trump-administration-3m
[https://perma.cc/G3D8-DM9P]
(warning that the Trump administration’s policy limiting personal protective
equipment exports could backfire on the administration).
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the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland, “[a]t least 69 countries
have banned or restricted the export of protective equipment, medical
devices or medicines.” 126
As society continues to move forward with the development
and procurement of COVID-19 vaccines, policymakers and
commentators have become particularly worried about what they have
called “vaccine nationalism” 127 or “pharmaceutical sovereignty.”128
From a public health standpoint, the adoption of nationalist policy
responses to address the global pandemic, while unsurprising, can be
highly dangerous because it will prevent the much-needed
international cooperation in the ongoing search for vaccines,
treatments, and cures as well as the continuous effort to “contain,
mitigate and defeat the pandemic.” 129 As Kathryn White and Maria

126. Peter S. Goodman et al., A New Front for Nationalism: The Global Battle
Against
a
Virus,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/coronavirus-vaccinenationalism.html [https://perma.cc/6ZY6-BSQJ].
127. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bollyky & Chad P. Bown, The Tragedy of Vaccine
Nationalism Only Cooperation Can End the Pandemic, FOREIGN AFFS. (Sept./Oct.
2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-07-27/vaccinenationalism-pandemic [https://perma.cc/F826-YC8K]; Ian Bremmer, What Vaccine
Nationalism Means for the Coronavirus, TIME (July 27, 2020),
https://time.com/5871532/vaccine-nationalism-coronavirus-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/7ELZ-D5PL]; Kate Kelland & Julie Steenhuysen, “Vaccine
Nationalism”: Is It Every Country For Itself?, REUTERS (July 29, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-vaccines-access-an/vaccinenationalism-is-it-every-country-for-itself-idUSKCN24U2DE
[https://perma.cc/T78W-TXKZ]; Kai Kupferschmidt, “Vaccine Nationalism”
Threatens Global Plan to Distribute COVID-19 Shots Fairly, SCI. (July 28, 2020),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/07/vaccine-nationalism-threatens-globalplan-distribute-covid-19-shots-fairly [https://perma.cc/J8G5-NRE7]; Richard Milne
& David Crow, Why Vaccine “Nationalism” Could Slow Coronavirus Fight, FIN.
TIMES (May 13 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6d542894-6483-446c-87b096c65e89bb2c [https://perma.cc/U4X9-EAVB]; Rebecca Weintraub et al., The
Danger of Vaccine Nationalism, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 22, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/05/the-danger-of-vaccine-nationalism
[https://perma.cc/ZN5R-JQ79].
128. Germán Velásquez, Re-thinking Global and Local Manufacturing of
Medical Products After COVID-19, at 3 (S. Ctr., Rsch. Paper No. 118, 2020).
129. See Global Solidarity to Fight the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),
¶ 5, G.A. Res. 74/270, U.N. Doc. A/RES/74/270 (Apr. 2, 2020) (calling for
“intensified international cooperation to contain, mitigate and defeat the pandemic,
including by exchanging information, scientific knowledge and best practices and
by applying the relevant guidelines recommended by the World Health
Organization”).
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Banda observed in relation to the outbreak of the H1N1 influenza,130
an earlier WHO-declared pandemic:
National pandemic preparedness, by its nature, is an
international issue: in a world lacking equitable access
to the cure, even the vaccinated would face devastation
if the global economy were to stop in its tracks. Instead
of hoarding the vaccine, the West ought to release it to
the most vulnerable, because the regions the first to be
hit would also be the first line of defence. 131
Because many countries that are breeding grounds for viral outbreaks
also struggle with poverty and infrastructure problems, 132 they need as
much international assistance as they can secure. The United States
and other developed and emerging countries should therefore provide
assistance while actively engaging in greater international
cooperation. These countries should do so not only out of altruism but
also because of the domestic need to protect national health
security. 133
130. See generally SARA ELLEN DAVIES ET AL., DISEASE DIPLOMACY:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 74–92 (2015) (discussing
the H1N1 pandemic).
131. Kathryn White & Maria Banda, The Role of Civil Society in Pandemic
Preparedness, in INNOVATION IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 105, 118 (Andrew
F. Cooper & John J. Kirton eds., 2009); see also SARA E. DAVIES, GLOBAL POLITICS
OF HEALTH 140 (2012) (“The first line of defence is ‘prevention, treatment and
control programs’ before the disease reached US shores.” (quoting a USAID
document)).
132. See Anthony S. Fauci, The Ebola Epidemic of 2014–2015: A Perfect Storm,
in GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE, supra note 94, at 21, 25 (“The
Ebola outbreak of 2014–2015 originated in severely under-resourced countries with
limited public health infrastructure and no prior experience controlling Ebola.”);
Colin McInnes, The Many Meanings of Health Security, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 7, 10 (Simon Rushton & Jeremy Youde eds., 2015)
(“[Those states that] have had very high levels of infection for more than a decade,
especially in sub-Saharan Africa[,] … are … among some of the poorest countries
on earth.”); Morten Broberg, A Critical Appraisal of the World Health
Organization’s International Health Regulations (2005) in Times of Pandemic: It Is
Time for Revision, 11 EUR. J. RISK REG. 202, 208 (2020) (“[B]ecause states in the
Global South, on average, have fewer resources to enable them to detect and respond
to transmittable diseases at an early stage, there is a higher risk that if such diseases
do break out, they may quickly become unmanageable in these country contexts.”);
Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1652 (“[P]overty and a lack of
infrastructure—whether in Asia, Africa, or other parts of the world—could create
‘weak links’ in the global response to pandemics.”).
133. As my colleagues at the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs noted in
their 2017 White Paper:
The problem of insufficient infrastructure is a global problem with
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As dangerous as they can be, nationalist pandemic responses
are also highly ineffective. Because global pandemics do not respect
territorial borders,134 nationalist approaches rarely provide effective
policy responses. As the webpage for the Access to COVID-19 Tools
Accelerator rightly reminded us, “[n]o-one is safe until everyone is
safe.” 135 The need for international cooperation to promote domestic
and global health security therefore cannot be overlooked.

implications for our homeland security. If localized outbreaks
become regional epidemics and/or global pandemics because
laboratories, clinics, and hospitals in developing nations do not
have the ability to rapidly detect and control outbreaks, then the
devastation caused by high-impact infectious diseases will enter
the United States, where we would face our own surge capacity
struggles.
SCOWCROFT INST. OF INT’L AFFS., TEXAS A&M UNIV., THE GROWING THREAT OF
PANDEMICS: ENHANCING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BIOSECURITY 31 (2017);
see also SIMON RUSHTON, SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH: PANDEMICS AND
POLITICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 37–38 (2019) (“The weakness of health
systems in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone led to what should have been at worst
a localized epidemic becoming a regional problem, with … the potential to transform
into a global pandemic.”); Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1630 (calling for
intellectual property negotiators to “realign their focus … [away from] trade benefits
… [and] with greater security benefits within the global health system”).
134. As Colin McInnes observed:
Health threats, the provision of health care services and the market
for pharmaceuticals are increasingly transborder in nature. In
terms of health security, this makes defence “at the border” a near
impossibility despite efforts by states to do just that. The state can
no longer function as a self-contained vessel for health provision
(and indeed health security), rather it has become permeable. This
is most obliviously the case with infectious disease where the
processes of globalization have enabled disease to spread more
quickly.
Colin McInnes, National Security and Global Health Governance, in GLOBAL
HEALTH GOVERNANCE: CRISIS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 42, 44
(Adrian Kay & Owain David Williams eds., 2009) (citation omitted); see also
OBIJIOFOR AGINAM, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PUBLIC HEALTH IN A DIVIDED WORLD 6 (2005) (“Microbes carry no national
passports, neither do they recognize geo-political boundaries or state sovereignty.”);
DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE 13–
16 (2004) (discussing the “germs do not recognize borders” mantra of public health);
MARK W. ZACHER & TANIA J. KEEFE, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH
GOVERNANCE: UNITED BY CONTAGION 1 (2008) (“The world is becoming an ever
smaller place, and microbes that cause devastating diseases do not stop for border
guards.”).
135. World Health Org., The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator,
https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator [https://perma.cc/6JPU-KUP4] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2020).
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To some extent, policymakers and governments seem to be
struck with a national pandemic response paradox: 136 while
policymakers and governments know full well that global pandemics
will necessitate cross-border solutions, the national public health
crises steer their time, efforts, and energies toward developing policies
to protect domestic constituents. 137 In this paradoxical policy
environment, one logically wonders whether we could develop new
models to better utilize the intellectual property system to address the
global pandemic. One may also be curious about what global actions
countries could take to enhance policy flexibilities and to more
effectively address the highly diverse national and sub-national
challenges posed by the global pandemic.
Although this Part does not have room to engage in a more
extended discussion of the various international, national, and subnational pandemic responses, some interesting models have emerged
136. Other commentators have identified similar paradoxes. For example, John
Kraemer and Mark Siedner observed:
A central paradox of the West African Ebola epidemic is that,
eventually,
high-income
countries
and
international
organizations—especially the governments of the United States,
the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, as well as the World
Bank—expended enormous resources to control the epidemic….
[T]hose same resources are rarely made available to prevent
epidemics, even though they would likely be more cost-effectively
deployed then and could avert greater mortality.
John D. Kraemer & Mark J. Siedner, The Effect of Ebola Virus Disease on Health
Outcomes and Systems in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, in GLOBAL
MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE, supra note 94, at 55, 67 (footnote omitted);
see also Peter G. Danchin et al., The Pandemic Paradox in International Law, 114
AM. J. INT’L L. 598, 599 (2020) (defining the “pandemic paradox” as “the fact that
the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the inherent logic and necessity of an effective
international legal order at a moment when ideas of supranational organization and
post-national sovereignty are increasingly resisted”); Mohamed S. El-Zomor &
Amin R. Yacoub, The Paradoxical Effect of COVID-19 on Globalisation, OXPOL
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://blog.politics.ox.ac.uk/the-paradoxical-effect-of-covid-19on-globalization/ [https://perma.cc/TDJ7-DQWV] (arguing that the COVID-19
pandemic “will set the stage for a potentially unprecedented era of global
cooperation” despite having the tendency to intensify nationalism).
137. See RUSHTON, supra note 133, at 1 (“Because of politics, governments fail
to cooperate internationally to prevent, detect and control outbreaks.”); see also
JEREMY YOUDE, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 141 (2012) (“Securitization …
promotes short-term, us-versus-them thinking.”); Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note
15, at 1569 (noting the disconnect between the domestic and international debates
on intellectual property and public health and the failure on the part of U.S. Congress
and administration to synchronize domestic laws and policies with global
developments).
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in the past year. To illustrate the wide array of policy options and
possibilities both within and outside the intellectual property system,
this Part focuses on three widely praised initiatives.
In March 2020, Costa Rica advanced a proposal to create a
patent pool of “technologies that are useful for the detection,
prevention, control and treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic.” 138
Building on the model that the Medicines Patent Pool utilizes 139 but
going beyond its focus on patents and essential medicines, 140 the
proposal stated:
This pool, which will involve voluntary assignments,
should include existing and future rights in patented
inventions and designs, as well rights in regulatory test
data, knowhow, cell lines, copyrights and blueprints
for manufacturing diagnostic tests, devices, drugs, or
vaccines. It should provide for free access or licensing
on reasonable and affordable terms, in every member
country.141
As part of its Solidarity Call to Action,142 the WHO embraced and
operationalized Costa Rica’s proposal and formally named it the
138. Letter from Carlos Alvarado Quesada, President of Costa Rica, to Tedros
Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org. (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/President-MoH-Costa-Rica-DrTedros-WHO24March2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RUT-6VAV] [hereinafter Costa
Rica Proposal].
139. Established in July 2010 as a spinoff from Unitaid, a global health initiative
financed by levies on plane tickets, the Medicines Patent Pool “aim[s] to increase
access to, and facilitate the development of, life-saving medicines for low- and
middle-income countries through an innovative approach to voluntary licensing and
patent
pooling.”
About
Us,
MEDICINES
PATENT
POOL,
https://medicinespatentpool.org/who-we-are/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/RH49X58X] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020).
140. See William Worley, COVID-19 Puts a Spotlight on the Medicines Patent
Pool, DEVEX (June 22, 2020), https://www.devex.com/news/covid-19-puts-aspotlight-on-the-medicines-patent-pool-97461
[https://perma.cc/KX82-S6BB]
(“MPP [Medicines Patent Pool] … has been [pooling technology] for a decade with
patents, although not with other types of intellectual property that C-TAP plans to
share, such as regulatory data. While there is not yet widespread agreement on how
to make tools for beating COVID-19 accessible, MPP’s mandate has already been
expanded to cover the illness.”); see also TRILATERAL STUDY, supra note 54, at 12
(“[W]ith the support of WHO and Unitaid, the Medicines Patent Pool has
temporarily expanded its mandate to cover any COVID-19-related health
technologies, including vaccines and diagnostics.”).
141. Costa Rica Proposal, supra note 138.
142. See Making the Response to COVID-19 a Public Common Good: Solidarity
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COVID-19 Technology Access Pool. 143 Known for its abbreviation CTAP, this technology pool is important because the technologies
needed to address the global pandemic will likely involve multiple
patent owners. 144 The pooling arrangement will therefore help prevent
what commentators have called “patent thickets” 145 or “the tragedy of
Call
to
Action,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(June
1,
2020),
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/globalresearch-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/covid-19-technology-accesspool/solidarity-call-to-action [https://perma.cc/WWU8-7LLY] (requesting “key
stakeholders and the global community to voluntarily pool knowledge, intellectual
property and data necessary for COVID-19”).
143. See COVID-19 Technology Access Pool, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/globalresearch-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/covid-19-technology-access-pool
[https://perma.cc/EE8M-7MGL] (last visited Aug. 23, 2020) (“[C-TAP] compile[s],
in one place, pledges of commitment made under the Solidarity Call to Action to
voluntarily share COVID-19 health technology related knowledge, intellectual
property and data.”); see also WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the
Media Briefing on COVID-19—29 May 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 29,
2020),
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-openingremarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---29-may-2020
[https://perma.cc/9SZV-3N7P] (identifying the five priorities of C-TAP).
144. As researchers from the Erasmus University Medical Center in the
Netherlands surmised in relation to the patent pool proposal during the outbreak of
the SARS coronavirus:
[In the absence of a patent pool, i]t is likely that patent rights
incorporating the SARS genomic sequence will be fragmented
across several groups. Sorting out these rights will be complex and
may require intervention of the law court…. [For firms
considering whether to develop a SARS vaccine], uncertainty over
patent rights makes this decision even more difficult, because it is
neither possible to determine the future cost of licensing the patent
rights, nor whether all necessary patents will be available for
licensing…. The incentive for vaccine manufacturers is therefore
to delay the decision to invest.
H.M. Simon et al., Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
Intellectual Property Rights: The Possible Role of Patent Pooling, 83 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 707, 708 (2005).
145. See ELLEN F.M. ‘T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION
OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 90 (2009)
(“Potential benefits of pooling include: a) reduced licensing transaction costs
through ‘one stop’ licensing rather than multiple agreements; b) elimination of
blocking patents; c) management of multiple owners and stacking of royalties ….”);
Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1600 (“[P]atent pools provide an efficient
and effective solution when patent rights are highly fragmented.”). Carl Shapiro
defined a patent thicket as “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights
that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new
technology.” Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120
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the anti-commons.” 146 The pool will further promote the research and
innovation needed to address the global pandemic. 147 At the
international level, the pool will also help promote the transfer of
technology from developed to developing countries 148 while
facilitating the greater integration of complementary technologies. 149
A month later, an international coalition of legal experts,
scientists, and technologists released the Open COVID Pledge, which
“calls on organizations around the world to make their patents and
copyrights freely available in the fight against the COVID-19
pandemic.” 150 Among the masterminds behind this initiative is Jorge
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
146. Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg defined the “the tragedy of the anticommons” as a situation in which “multiple owners each have a right to exclude
others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.” Michael
A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998); see also MICHAEL
HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 49–78 (2010) (discussing the
tragedy of the anti-commons in the biomedical research area).
147. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB.
HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 53 (2006) (“Patent pools of upstream technologies may be useful
in some circumstances to promote innovation relevant to developing countries.”);
see also Dianne Nicol & Jane Nielsen, Opening the Dam: Patent Pools, Innovation
and Access to Essential Medicines, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH:
PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 235, 238 (Thomas Pogge et al.
eds., 2010) [hereinafter INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH] (“Patent pooling
may … hold promise at the upstream discovery phase of the innovation cycle.”).
148. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & GRAHAM DUKES, GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL
POLICY: ENSURING MEDICINES FOR TOMORROW’S WORLD 39 (2011) (“Patent pools
are sufficiently common as to have become subject to a fairly sophisticated level of
regulation, for example, in the European Commission guidelines on technology
transfer. Many of the issues surrounding the negotiation and implementation of
patent pools already are anticipated by competition authorities.”); ‘T HOEN, supra
note 145, at 90 (pointing out that these pools have the potential to both “encompass
non-patent technology and know-how” and “facilitate technology transfer and a
sustainable scaling-up of capacity and access in the developing world”).
149. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995) (“[Patent pools] may
provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies ….”).
But see Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 147, at 237 (“[Patent pools] could be both anticompetitive, particularly if they encourage collusion and shield weak patents, and
anti-innovative (or innovation-neutral), particularly if they don’t include all
necessary patents or are poorly managed and inadequately resourced.”).
150. OPEN
COVID
PLEDGE,
https://opencovidpledge.org/
[https://perma.cc/7AQP-UP6P] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020). For discussions of
patent pledges, see generally PATENT PLEDGES (Jorge Contreras & Meredith Jacob
eds., 2017); Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543 (2015).
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Contreras, a contributor to this special issue. Since its creation, the
Open COVID Pledge has attracted the support of Amazon, AT&T,
Facebook, Fujitsu, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Intel, Microsoft,
Mitsubishi, Uber, and other leading patent holders. 151 At the time of
writing, this timely pledge has already covered the following
intellectual properties:
3D-printed respirators, touch screens that use
ultraviolet light to prevent the spread of infection, a
Wi-Fi enabled floating hospital, methods for designing
grocery stores to ensure social distancing, a low-cost,
single-use ventilator, software for accelerating disease
diagnosis, algorithms for routing emergency vehicles
through traffic, [and] a drive-up booth for Covid-19
testing. 152
This Open COVID Pledge built on the tireless efforts that
policymakers, commentators, and activists have undertaken in the past
two decades to show why open innovation can be highly beneficial in
the public health arena, especially in relation to vaccine and drug
development. 153 This pledge will greatly enhance the cooperation and
collaboration among individuals, businesses, not-for-profit
organizations, and government and intergovernmental agencies
throughout the world. As Henry Chesbrough reminded us:
Opening up mobilizes knowledge from many different
places, causing our learning to advance and our
progress against the disease to accelerate. Openness
unleashes a volunteer army of researchers, working in
151. Pledgors, OPEN COVID PLEDGE, https://opencovidpledge.org/partners/
[https://perma.cc/V25S-6HWY] (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
152. Jorge Contreras, Putting Pledged IP to Work—Identifying IP Available
Under the Open COVID Pledge, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (June 12, 2020),
https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/06/12/putting-pledged-ip-to-work-identifyingip-available-under-the-open-covid-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/AMK4-VHNA].
153. For discussions of open innovation in the pharmaceutical context, see
generally GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT
POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 169–
244 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009); Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Open Source Drug
Discovery: A Revolutionary Paradigm or a Utopian Model?, in INCENTIVES FOR
GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 147, at 263; Amy Kapczynski, Order Without
Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539
(2017); Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031
(2005).
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their own facilities, across different time zones, and
different countries. Openness leverages the human
capital available in the world to tackle the disease, and
also accesses the physical capital (such as plant and
equipment) already in place to launch rapid testing of
possible solutions.
….
Open innovation can help speed things up. The
availability of the gene sequencing of the coronavirus
establishes a clear target to all of us. The 50+ vaccine
candidates being considered are all already-approved
drugs for other medical uses. This means that each
candidate’s basic safety dosage levels in humans have
already been established. This allows the testing to start
in the middle of the usual drug development process,
with the Phase 1 safety protocols already completed.
Releasing all the relevant medical research at once, in
a machine-readable form that allows rapid absorption
of the science, to anyone who wants to look at it, allows
researchers from all over the world to contribute. And
not just professional researchers and scientists, but also
amateur researchers who have a passion and a hunch to
test. 154
Finally, toward the end of April 2020, the WHO worked with
Gavi and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations to
launch the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (“COVAX”)
Initiative.155 This initiative aims to “accelerate the development and
manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines … and to guarantee fair and
equitable access for every country in the world.” 156 The initiative’s
154. Henry Chesbrough, To Recover Faster from Covid-19, Open Up:
Managerial Implications from an Open Innovation Perspective, 88 INDUS.
MARKETING MGMT. 410, 410–11 (2020); see also U.N. Sec’y-Gen.’s High-Level
Panel on Access to Medicines, supra note 10, at 27 (“Open models of innovation,
which are generally patent free and often rely on quick, straightforward licensing,
… [are] especially important to lower the hurdles of entry and accelerate the pace of
development of health technologies, including those needed to combat emergent
diseases.”).
155. COVAX: Working for Global Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax
[https://perma.cc/L6QD-R5D3] (last visited Aug. 18, 2020).
156. Id.
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current target is to create two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines that
will be equitably distributed among the participating countries. 157 By
July 2020, seventy-five countries had expressed interest in joining the
COVAX Facility and “financ[ing] the vaccines from their own public
finance budgets.” 158 The initiative will further allow these countries to
“partner with up to 90 lower-income countries that could be supported
through voluntary donations to Gavi’s COVAX Advance Market
Commitment.” 159 As this special issue goes to print, the United States,
under the new Biden Administration, has just announced its plan to
join the COVAX Facility.160
The launch of this global development and procurement
initiative is badly needed as the world currently does not have the
necessary capacity to manufacture vaccines for the entire global
population.161 As South Africa rightly acknowledged in its general
157. See
COVAX
Explained,
GAVI
(Sept.
3,
2020),
https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained
[https://perma.cc/2LNRT8M3] (“All participating countries, regardless of income levels, will have equal
access to these vaccines once they are developed. The initial aim is to have 2 billion
doses available by the end of 2021, which should be enough to protect high risk and
vulnerable people, as well as frontline healthcare workers.”).
158. Press Release, World Health Org., More Than 150 Countries Engaged in
COVID-19
Vaccine
Global
Access
Facility
(July
15,
2020),
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/15-07-2020-more-than-150-countriesengaged-in-covid-19-vaccine-global-access-facility
[https://perma.cc/C97BFACB].
159. Id.
160. See Stephanie Nebehay, U.S., Staying in WHO, to Join COVID Vaccine Push
for Poor Nations: Fauci, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2021, 3:38 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-who-usa/u-s-staying-inwho-to-join-covid-vaccine-push-for-poor-nations-fauci-idUSKBN29Q12B
[https://perma.cc/6JLQ-VK47] (providing a list of countries participating in the
COVAX Initiative).
161. As a Lancet editorial noted:
To protect the global population, 6.2 billion doses of pandemic
vaccine will be needed, but under current manufacturing capacity
the world can only produce 500 million doses. And, in a pandemic,
it is industrialised countries that will have access to available
vaccines, whereas developing countries—where a pandemic is
likely to emerge—will be left wanting. In November, 2004, a
WHO consultation reached the depressing conclusion that most
developing countries would have no access to vaccine during the
first wave of a pandemic and possibly throughout its duration.
Editorial, Global Solidarity Needed in Preparing for Pandemic Influenza, 369
LANCET 532, 532 (2007) [hereinafter Global Solidarity Needed]; see also PEOPLE’S
HEALTH MOVEMENT ET AL., GLOBAL HEALTH WATCH 2: AN ALTERNATIVE WORLD
HEALTH REPORT 233 (2008) (“As drug companies can produce only a limited
amount of vaccines in a given year, many developed countries have made advance
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statement in the July 2020 meeting of the Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights at the WTO:
The challenge before us is to produce an effective
vaccine to meet the needs of the world population of
7.8 billion in as short a time frame as possible. This will
require the sharing of knowledge and technology of
successful vaccines so that the widest distribution at
lowest cost can be achieved. 162
Even with its targeted two billion doses, the COVAX Initiative
provides only a quarter of the vaccines needed for the entire global
population. That number will be significantly lowered by a factor of
multiples if the vaccine requires timed or regular boosters to create
immunity.163
The problem concerning global vaccine shortage is nothing
new. For developing countries, it was a major issue during the H1N1
pandemic 164 as well as the earlier H5N1 avian influenza outbreak.165
Indeed, the concerns about such shortage were so acute that Indonesia,
purchase orders for vaccines, limiting even further the prospects of countries like
Indonesia benefiting from vaccine development.” (citation omitted)).
162. Nirmalya Syam, WTO TRIPS Council Discusses National IP Measures and
TRIPS Flexibilities in the Context of COVID-19 (S. Ctr., SouthNews No. 327, Aug.
7,
2020),
https://us5.campaignarchive.com/?u=fa9cf38799136b5660f367ba6&id=184960e08b
[https://perma.cc/X9Q2-HQD6]; see also Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting—Held in the Centre William
Rappard on 30 July 2020, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/95/Add.1 (Oct. 2, 2020) (providing
the minutes of the July 2020 meeting).
163. See Sarah Pitt, A Coronavirus Vaccine May Require Boosters—Here’s What
That Means, CONVERSATION (July 29, 2020), https://theconversation.com/acoronavirus-vaccine-may-require-boosters-heres-what-that-means-143370
[https://perma.cc/83AA-B28W] (“[I]t currently seems likely that most potential
vaccines designed to protect against the SARS-CoV-2 virus that causes COVID-19
will require boosters, perhaps regularly.”); Kevin Rawlinson, More Data Needed
Before Giving Just One Vaccine Dose, Says Covid Adviser, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23,
2020 12:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/23/more-dataneeded-before-second-vaccine-dose-diverted-to-first-timers-says-covid-adviser
[https://perma.cc/ED3E-LDMC] (reporting the emerging debate on the sufficiency
of a single, as opposed to double, dose of the currently approved vaccine).
164. See David P. Fidler, Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines:
Global Health Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza
H5N1 and Pandemic Influenza H1N1, 7 PLOS MED. e1000247, at 1 (2010)
(“Developed countries placed large advance orders for 2009-H1N1 vaccine and
bought virtually all the vaccine companies could manufacture.”).
165. See Global Solidarity Needed, supra note 161 (expressing sympathy to the
developing countries’ concern at the time of the H5N1 avian influenza outbreak
about their lack of adequate and affordable access to pandemic vaccines).
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India, Thailand, and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement 166
began asserting highly controversial claims of “viral sovereignty” to
protect the virus samples they had collected from patients or animals
on their soils.167 Their wish to protect their own nationals and residents
is no different from those policymakers who are now pushing for
nationalist policies in the United States and other developed countries.
Moreover, as Ana Santos Rutschman noted in her contribution
to this Symposium and in other articles written before the COVID-19
pandemic, vaccine development often requires different incentive
frameworks and funding arrangements. 168 In developing countries,
166. Established during the cold war, the Non-Aligned Movement provides a
forum for over 100 developing countries that do not align with any power bloc. See
History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFS.
(Aug.
22,
2012),
https://www.mea.gov.in/in-focusarticle.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement
[https://perma.cc/7SH5-HC3P] (providing the history of the Non-Aligned
Movement).
167. See Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1604–18 (discussing the H5N1
avian influenza outbreak and the position taken by Indonesia and other countries).
See generally VIRAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE CHANGING
GLOBAL SYSTEM FOR SHARING PATHOGENS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (Sam
Halabi & Rebecca Katz eds., 2020) (collecting articles that explore the implications
of viral sovereignty claims to global biomedical research and issues relating to the
control and sharing of pathogens and related data).
168. As Professor Santos Rutschman observed:
[I]n spite of the increasing burden posed by infectious diseases in
the United States and abroad, the market for vaccines targeting
emerging pathogens is often considered unprofitable. Globally,
very few private companies currently engage in vaccine research
and development …, and the public sector currently lacks the
capacity to fully develop and manufacture new vaccines on its
own. While the rates of vaccine-related patent applications
increased, over time the number of new vaccines entering the
market each year has remained relatively low.
Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV.
729, 731 (2019); see also Rutschman, Vaccine Markets, supra note 93, at 111
(“Vaccines are often described as one of the most unprofitable types of
biopharmaceutical goods, under-incentivized from a research and development …
perspective, and routinely failing to attract sufficient investment from traditional
funders in biopharma.”). Xue Qiwei and Lisa Ouellette concurred:
[A]bsent significant government intervention in healthcare
markets—such as mandatory or free vaccination—the prospect of
monopoly profits will under-incentivize the development of
vaccines relative to treatments. In particular, traditional marketbased [intellectual property] incentives may be specifically
insufficient for promoting vaccine development, despite the
outsized social benefits of vaccines. And IP [intellectual
property]–based allocation is also ill-suited to the vaccine context,
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efforts to distribute vaccines frequently encounter barriers that are
unrelated to the intellectual property system; 169 inadequate public
health infrastructure is the oft-documented culprit 170 behind the socalled “last-mile problem.” 171 As WIPO Director General Francis
Gury reminded us, “there are many other policy challenges in the
management of the COVID-19 crisis that are not directly related to
[intellectual property] and innovation” and that do not involve the
“question of [intellectual property] blocking access to vital medical
vaccines, treatments or cures.”172
Taken together, these three initiatives have shown that the
debate on the modalities of protection is far from binary. While patents
and regulatory exclusivities often come to mind when we explore the
possible incentive frameworks to promote pharmaceutical innovation,
there are many other policy options, incentive frameworks, and
funding arrangements 173 both within and outside the intellectual
as illustrated most recently by the many calls to make any
COVID-19 vaccine affordable and available to all.
Qiwei Claire Xue & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy and the Market for
Vaccines, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 7 (2020) (footnote omitted).
169. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 18, at 853
(noting the need “to distinguish among the IP-relevant, IP-related, and IP-irrelevant
factors and develop solutions that are tailored to each type of factor”).
170. See DAVIES, supra note 131, at 180 (“An inadequate number of health care
workers to distribute the vaccine, community resistance, and the waxing and waning
of donor interest all contribute to the premature end of vaccination projects.”); Ana
Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways from Recent
Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170, 174 (2020) (“Some
types of vaccines—such as live virus vaccines—are particularly sensitive to
temperature changes, a feature that poses enhanced problems in reaching vaccine
markets in remote areas of the Global South.”); Adam Kamradt-Scott, Creating a
COVID-19 Vaccine Is Only the First Step. It’ll Take Years to Manufacture and
Distribute, CONVERSATION (Aug. 17, 2020), https://theconversation.com/creatinga-covid-19-vaccine-is-only-the-first-step-itll-take-years-to-manufacture-anddistribute-144352 [https://perma.cc/95J7-23PA] (“Most vaccines need to be
transported in cold storage, which presents a problem for many parts of the world
where electricity failure is a common feature of daily life.”); see also SCOWCROFT
INST. OF INT’L AFFS., supra note 133, at 33 (“Diagnostics must be able to run without
electricity and withstand temperature extremes and power surges, or they will be of
limited use in many developing countries.” (citation omitted)).
171. Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Better Pharmaceutical
Innovations at Much Lower Prices, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH,
supra note 147, at 135, 141.
172. Gurry, supra note 107, ¶ 10.
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property system. 174 Thus, if we are to design effective policy
responses to address a global pandemic, we will need to deploy a
holistic and multidisciplinary approach to evaluate the different
possibilities at the international, national, and sub-national levels. 175
V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown us firsthand that
countries will need different policy responses to address a global
pandemic. What works for the northern hemisphere may not work well
for the southern hemisphere, especially if seasonal changes will affect
the pandemic at issue. 176 Likewise, what makes good policy sense in
developed countries may generate bad or unintended consequences in
the developing world.177 Because the COVID-19 pandemic has posed
innovations, a range of other incentives such as prizes, grants, and subsidies … exist
to motivate technological innovation.”). For discussions of grants, prizes, and
advance market commitments, see generally TRILATERAL STUDY, supra note 54, at
156–58; INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 147, 135–208;
Michael Kremer et al., Designing Advance Market Commitments for New Vaccines,
HARV. SCHOLAR (Dec. 2019) https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/kremer/files/amc_
design_36.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YE8-52D4].
174. As Amy Kapczynski observed:
IP scholarship has for decades been centered on a simple account:
IP is necessary to achieve the information production that we as a
society desire. But over the last few years, the field has come to
recognize that IP as an approach has both significant costs and
substantial limits. In response, an important new scholarly
literature on “intellectual production without intellectual
property,” or “IP without IP” has emerged.
Kapczynski, supra note 153, at 1542–43 (footnotes omitted); see also Yu, A HalfCentury of Scholarship, supra note 75, at 1137 n.370 (collecting “IP without IP”
scholarship).
175. See Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 15, at 1621–27 (discussing the need for
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176. See A. Odysseus Patrick & Max Bearak, Winter Is Coming South of the
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2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/winter-is-coming-southof-the-equator-along-with-predictions-of-the-coronavirusspreading/2020/06/04/c0dd4c92-a4c9-11ea-898e-b21b9a83f792_story.html
[https://perma.cc/P22X-RFLD] (“As countries in the Northern Hemisphere tilt into
summer and emerge from months-long coronavirus shutdowns, winter arrives this
month in subtropical parts of the Southern Hemisphere—and with it increased
concern for the virus’s spread.”).
177. See Alex Broadbent, South Africa’s Leaders Have Had a Crack at COVID19: It’s Time to Give the People a Go, CONVERSATION (July 16, 2020, 12:03 PM),
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diverse policy challenges at the international, national, and subnational levels, it is high time we developed a deeper understanding of
the different modalities of intellectual property protection, the
interplay between these modalities, and the possibilities for incentive
frameworks and funding arrangements outside the intellectual
property system. It is my hope that this Symposium will help generate
new ideas to improve the intellectual property system and to enhance
its ability to address public health needs at both the domestic and
international levels.
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Africa, millions will starve if the global economy enters a protracted downturn. We
must ask whether the number will be more than COVID-19 will kill in a region
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